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Introduction 
On the eve of the American Revolution, when representatives from Britain's 
thirteen original colonies gathered to discuss the logistics of war and the value of 
independence, the newly conquered colony of Quebec stood apart. Isolated 
geographically, socially, politically, and religiously, Quebec was an anomaly in that it 
enjoyed an unprecedented level of autonomy. When the Quebec Act passed in 177 4, 
the Quebecois gained even more freedom as they were granted a tremendous amount 
of religious tolerance and political jurisdiction. Applied to a culture already accustomed 
to a more rugged frontier way of life, such freedom allowed for the Quebecois to remain 
extremely politically divided. Under the council of Governor Sir Guy Carleton, members 
of Quebec's upper class and clergy confessed their loyalty to British Parliament while 
the peasants remained rather indifferent and unaffected. Altogether, unlike their 
neighbors to the south, the Quebecois showed relatively little concern over notions such 
as taxation without representation. 
After the passing of the Quebec Act, the other colonies felt rather ambivalent 
towards Quebec. Being the direct benefiters of an act, which was widely held in disdain 
by the other colonists, the Quebecois were naturally scrutinized. The Continental 
Congress, however, could ill afford to marginalize the Quebecois. With Lake Champlain 
proving a veritable super highway from Canada right through the heart of New England 
and New York, the Continental Congress was instead forced to sit back and anxiously 
await Quebec's political stance. Initially, in a Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec on 24 
October 177 4, the Continental Congress expressed this anxiety. The Continental 
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Congress argued that Parliament was attempting to "confer on one Part the height of 
Power and Happiness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of Weakness & Misery" 
and that "the intent of good laws, is to oppose this Effort, and to diffuse their Influence, 
universally & equally."1 With British Parliament setting a precedent of reversing 
decisions pertaining to constitutional rights, the Continental Congress declared no rights 
to be "unalienable," and that all was subject to the whims of "Ministers of this flagitious 
Temper" who "have dared to violate the most sacred Compacts & obligations."2 The 
letter goes on to describe these various constitutional rights, which the Quebecois might 
have been ignorant of. The intent of the letter was to win Canadian allegiance for the 
coming war. 
Throughout the following year, as the situation between Britain and the colonies 
became more severe, several more attempts were made to urge the Quebecois to join 
in revolt. If nothing else, the goal was to stem a British advance down the Lake 
Champlain waterway. When Quebec refused to break neutrality, an invasion army was 
sent. After taking the fortifications of Ticonderoga, Saint John, and Montreal, the 
American army was ultimately halted at the walls of Quebec City on 31 December 1775. 
General Montgomery fell during this hopeless battle, precipitating a high level of 
desertion. The city, loosely held under siege by what remained of the colonial army for 
five months was ultimately reinforced by the arrival of a British fleet. The invasion would 
have been a complete failure, had Benedict Arnold not halted a British counter-invasion 
down Lake Champlain just before the waterway froze over for the winter. 3 
Over the course of the campaign, the Quebecois responded in a variety of 
different ways. There were those who answered Carleton's call by flocking to defend 
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the walls of Quebec City. Then, there were those who sympathized with the 
Bostonians, and actually fought alongside Arnold and Montgomery against their fellow 
countrymen. Many sold their services to the highest bidder, fighting only as hard as 
would get them paid. But the vast majority of the Quebecois remained disinterested, 
even as the war was brought to their doorsteps. In an attempt to better understand the 
Invasion of Canada, the differing viewpoints of the Quebecois colonists require specific 
research. 
Through the tracing of the origins of the Quebec Act, this paper achieves a 
greater acumen of the British conquest of Canada as a whole, revealing the social and 
cultural significance that the American Revolution had upon the various Quebecois 
classes. Most of the discussion on this topic by scholars of American history focuses on 
the stepping-stone mentality of everything as it relates to America achieving its 
independence. There is a generous amount of research from scholars of both British 
and Canadian history on the subject, unfortunately, this research also becomes 
problematic, as it tends to deal mostly with the political perspective of Britain losing the 
American Colonies. For instance, renowned Canadian historian Philip Lawson takes 
into account the imperialist perspective when he asks, "what effect the conquest of 
Quebec had on Britain," and attempts "to treat the debate over Quebec on its own 
merits, as contemporaries did." However, while Lawson's historiography proves 
priceless to future historians, it speaks mostly to the political historian, leaving the social 
historian to find another avenue4 
This paper seeks to give voice to the voiceless by paying particular attention to 
the Quebecois citizens as the British conquest and Revolutionary War flipped their lives 
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upside down. By examining current historiography and digging through annals of 
primary documents, this paper looks to provide a greater understanding of the Canadian 
perspective of the American Revolution. To this end, I have employed in detail the 
contributions of Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, as their painstaking efforts of 
chronicling Canada's history through original documents proves the very foundation of 
all scholasticism on the subject. While the documents I employ are written primarily 
from the viewpoints of British officials and the merchant class, it is my intention to draw 
from them as many different perspectives as possible. 
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Chapter 1> "The right Administration of Government in Quebec is a matter of the 
greatest lmportance"5 : Britain's Struggle with the Assimilation of Quebec. 
When Quebec was ceded to the British Empire following the Treaty of Paris in 
1763, British legislators were faced with a conundrum. An entire colony of French 
Catholics needed to be seamlessly worked into an imperial engine that had fervently 
disallowed any attachment to the Roman Church. Moreover, the Quebecois colonists 
had for the previous century and a half been practicing a feudal style of civil law and 
administration completely contrary to the governor/assembly structure implemented by 
Britain throughout its North American colonies. The debates in Parliament over how 
best to administer government in Quebec spanned several years and encompassed a 
raft of conflicting viewpoints. While ultimately in 1774 Britain decided to pass the 
Quebec Act and concede to the Quebecois their French civil law and Catholic worship, 
the eleven years prior saw Parliament unable to transcend the stigma of legislating for 
the benefit of conquered French Catholics. In order to understand how such legislation 
impacted the Quebecois' role in the American Revolution, this chapter describes the 
political battlefield that was Quebec after the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. In 
particular, this chapter explores of the varying classes of Quebecois, to better analyze 
the effects of Britain's legislation. 
On 5 June 1762, Governor James Murray sent a letter to the King addressing the 
state of the government in Quebec. In it, Murray detailed every aspect of the French 
civil administration that permeated Quebec prior to British annexation. Having ruled for 
the previous two years as the Lieutenant Governor during the military occupation of 
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Quebec, Murray's report pointed out corruption and civil injustices, which he attributed 
to unchecked abuse of governmental positions. Murray clearly showed early signs of 
the salesmanship that would come to characterize his term of office as he explicated the 
differences between France's feudal administration, and the British assemblies. 
Breaking down the Quebecois social structure, Murray detailed four distinct classes of 
French Canadians. Perched at the top of the social hierarchy, Murray claimed was "the 
Gentry, or what they call Nobility." Next, he continued with the clergy, followed by "the 
Merchants or trading part." Lastly, Murray listed at the bottom of the hierarchy "the 
Peasantry or what is here stilled, Habitant." 6 
In his analysis of the gentry class, Murray remarked "they are extremely vain 
and have an utter contempt for the trading part of the colony, tho' they made no scruple 
to engage in it, pretty deeply too, whenever a convenient opportunity served." Through 
such correspondence, it became clear from the start that Murray felt no shortage of 
prejudice towards the Quebecois upper class. Murray described this upper class as 
"great Tyrants to their vassals who seldom met with redress, let their grievances be ever 
so just." The gentry, Murray concluded, would "not relish the British Government from 
which they can neither expect the same employments or the same douceurs, they 
enjoyed under the French." Instead, Murray strategized winning the colony's allegiance 
through the other three classes.7 
In contrast to his appraisal of the gentry, Murray's account of the peasantry or 
habitants was rather auspicious. Though he initially believed the peasants were 
brainwashed into believing the English "were worse than brutes" who "ruled with a rod 
of iron," shortly after the conquest Murray found them to be rather open to British 
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occupation. Murray described the Quebecois peasants' cohabitation with English 
soldiers during the first two years of British rule as "a harmony unexampled even at 
home." Through his correspondence, it is clear that Murray felt a deep appreciation for 
the Quebecois peasantry. Declaring the peasants to be "virtuous in their morals and 
temperate in their living," Murray set a precedent of Quebecois sympathy, which can be 
interpreted as the impetus of the Quebec Act. Murray went so far as to state that if "the 
free exercise of their religion will be continued to them once Canada is irrecoverably 
ceded by a Peace the people will soon become faithful and good subjects to His 
Majesty." It was Murray's belief that Quebec's potential worth lied in the hidden value of 
its peasantry. 8 
Quebec, as a colony was as disparate to Britain's other North American holdings 
as France was to England. To truly appreciate the difference between the colonies, one 
must understand the dissimilarities of their mother countries. In Quebec's case, before 
British conquest the government was mirrored on the feudal system of France, 
however, there were some distinct differences. Unlike France's ancient lineage of noble 
appointments, the various administrative offices held in New France were merit-based, 
and subject only to the King's approval, which worked ideally to ensure virtue and 
efficiency. As can be imagined, the subjectivity of such appointments seldom led to 
ideal officers. 
With New France being markedly different than Old France, a greater sense of 
freedom existed for the habitants. Quebec's peasant-class was comprised of colonists, 
who in the mother country held barely enough land to provide subsistence. Once 
transplanted to Quebec, the habitants were able to lease plots of over a hundred acres, 
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almost ten times larger than their holdings in France. The habitants also enjoyed 
certain privileges such as hunting and fishing, both illegal to peasants back in France. 
Such freedom provided greater financial opportunity to the habitants of Quebec than 
ever could be imagined in France. Seigniorial rent was modest, taxes light, and church 
tithes were greatly subsidized by the crown as incentive to keep the colony stable.9 
Though the habitants proved the crucial cog to the Canadian cause long before 
Murray was able to praise their merit, there simply were not enough of them for New 
France to compete with British interests. By 1660, Quebec had held a population of just 
over three thousand, compared to the 58,000 English colonists who stretched from New 
England down to the Chesapeake. From its inception to the end of the seventeenth 
century, New France had expanded but not nearly at the rate the French crown would 
have liked. The difficulty for France in emulating Britain's colonial immigration success 
lied in a lack of French interest in trans-Atlantic passage. Due to the enclosure 
movement, which resulted in a monstrous rate of homelessness, Britain had no 
problems enticing impoverished and destitute subjects to gamble on a fresh start in the 
New World. Not being faced with the same unemployment dilemma, France needed to 
be much more creative with its incentive programs. As a stimulus, the French offered 
seigniorial fiefs to those who could transport their own settlers. Soon, a very 
unorthodox version of French feudalism predominated the social structure of New 
France. Initially based on a military design, the bureaucratic system of New France 
soon seemed just as efficient than that of the British colonies.10 
Based on the functioning bureaucracy of England, the governmental structure of 
the British colonies also featured several key distinctions. Like in England, no 
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seigniorial system existed in the British colonies. Rather, based on the marriage of 
Parliament to the king, the British colonies enjoyed a three-tiered governmental system. 
Directly representing the king was the royally appointed colonial governor, whose job it 
was to protect the interests of British royal policy, and to ensure the colonies met their 
end of the mercantile agreement. Mirroring Parliament were the assemblies, elected by 
the people to provide representation for the people. 
There was a marked difference between the Parliament of England and the 
colonial assemblies. Because the colonies were clearly devoid of nobility, there was no 
need for a House of Lords. This lack of nobility throughout the 1600's allowed for the 
English colonists to mostly rule themselves, which provided the wealthiest of merchants 
the most power. Royally appointed governors technically had the last say in all matters, 
but feisty colonists constantly threatened rebellion if the governors challenged elected 
assemblies. As a check on the assemblies, and to further ensure the governors were 
not completely out-numbered, there was the governor's council, consisting of members 
appointed by the governor himself. The council generally handled matters of judicial 
nature, but also frequently managed to rouse public attention, and provided the basis for 
political parties in the New World. With the seigniorial system in New France leaving no 
room for a powerful merchant class, the French nobility in Quebec dominated all 
aspects of civil administration.11 
The British colonies may have dwarfed New France in terms of population, but 
British geographical advances were constantly stymied by France's claim on the 
Mississippi River. Territory disputes frequently resulted in the form of four different 
French and Indian Wars. As thriving British colonies desired to push westward, 
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France's claim on the interior of North America was constantly challenged. With but a 
fraction of Britain's colonial population, New France was able to hold the Mississippi for 
over a century and a half. Finally, during the fourth French and Indian War, while 
France was preoccupied in Europe by the Prussian army, England managed to wholly 
dedicate itself to the conquering of North America. Britain ultimately overwhelmed New 
France and the result was the capitulation of Quebec in 1759. 
After the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, to the astonishment of many 
(especially the inhabitants of Quebec), France ceded Quebec in order to hold on to its 
islands in the West lndes. France was done fighting over a colony that offered little 
profit and a great deal of conflict. The Canadians became British subjects, but with the 
prejudices that came with being Roman Catholic. Any Canadian not wishing to be ruled 
by the British Empire was free to return to France, but few could afford it. Only 270 left 
the colony. As far as the British were concerned, Quebec was to be considered an 
investment. The Citizens in London scoured the newspapers for investment information 
dealing with the mercantile trade in Quebec, and the colony's economic speculation 
played a great role in the passing of early legislation. Many in London demanded as 
much information about Canada and its inhabitants as could be obtained. After all, the 
conquered colony was already established, all that was needed was a new direction.12 
In his own letter to the King on the state of the government in 1762, Ralph 
Burton, Lt. Governor of Trois-Rivieres nearly echoed Governor Murray's opinion by 
praising the habitants. By stating, "the King's Rights and Privileges, as every other 
Branch of the Ancient Administration, has been the most powerful means of stopping 
the progress of this Colony,"13 Burton's opined French Canada could be administered 
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efficiently once the seigniorial system was removed. Burton went so far as to suppose 
that the gentry were "the only People, who may perhaps Intend to Remove, if the 
Country should Remain under the Government of Great Britain." He further declared 
"they Chuse not to Speak upon the Subject, as they still flatter themselves with tacit & 
Distant hopes of the Country being Returned to its former Masters." The prevailing 
sentiment among Quebec's various governors shortly after the conquest was that the 
gentry needed replacing, while the habitants were the key to colonial success.14 
In order to win over the French civil bureaucracy without alienating the habitants, 
Quebec's British governors realized the value of the Catholic clergy. Murray, 
specifically emphasized the importance of French priests and bishops; he suggested to 
the King "for the sake of keeping them in proper subjection, to nominate them himself or 
by those who act under his authority."15 It was his notion that the Quebecois clergy was 
directly tied to the French civil administration, and that by emulating Quebec's design, 
rather than by forbidding Catholic practice, allegiance would be automatic. Being that 
the Arlicles of Capitulation signed on 8 September 1760 stated the Canadians were free 
to exercise their worship in the Catholic faith, Murray and the other governors 
anticipated a peaceable alliance with the clergy. 16 
Despite the wording of the Arlicles of Capitulation, and regardless of 
correspondence from the governors, British Parliament hesitated to guarantee any 
amount of religious tolerance to the Quebecois. This is mostly due to the fact that the 
Treaty of Paris, signed in 1763 renegotiated the terms set by the Arlicles of Capitulation. 
While the treaty did offer some religious guarantees of its own, the updated wording 
was rather ambiguous. Parliament, clinging to the treaty's ambiguity, was able to justify 
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legally its denial of the Quebecois' civil law and Catholic worship. After the treaty was 
signed, Parliament hurried through the Royal Proclamation of 1763, a piece of 
legislation described by Canadian historian Fernand Oullette as "far too opposed to 
reality to withstand the test of time." 17 
While the French Canadian gentry, clergy, and trading classes fought for a place 
within the British imperial system, Governor Murray struggled with the changing of 
regimes in Parliament. Labeled as a minority sympathizer, Murray was disliked by a 
great many in London. During his administration, the prevailing thought in England was 
that Quebecois society could be "molded into a mirror image of Britain."18 Murray 
understood differently. He conveyed in a letter to the Lords of Trade that while "nothing 
will satisfy the Licentious Fanaticks trading here, but the expulsion of the Canadians 
who are perhaps the bravest and the best race upon the Globe,"19 the Canadians, 
"cou'd they be indulged with a few priveledges" could "become the most faithful and 
most useful set of Men in this American Empire." With boasts like this, there could be 
no doubt as to Murray's political stance on the Quebecois. Regardless of the raft of 
optimistic reports on Canada's future sent by Murray, Gage, and Burton, the opinions 
swirling around London were that Quebec had been a failure of a colony under French 
rule, and unless every aspect of the old administration was inundated with the proven 
British model, it held at best a blinkered future. 20 
Such was the case in the mid 1760's when policy makers such as the Earl of 
Shelburne sought to incorporate the French Canadians, while others argued for the 
arrant abolition of Catholic worship in Canada. Shelburne's thinking was to avoid the 
possibility of a French Canadian uprising by disconnecting the Quebecois from their 
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reliance upon the French Catholic hierarchy without forbidding them their sacred 
practices. In doing so, Shelburne, like Murray proposed to create a new hierarchy in the 
Canadian bishopric, one that would be subject to the jurisdiction of the King. Shelburne 
argued, "that the Influence of Religion or rather Superstition is confined to a certain 
latitude, and that Nothing is to be feared from its effects in America."21 The Quebecois 
were continually reported to be nothing if not submissive to British rule, especially while 
under the impression their Catholic faith was to be tolerated. Though seemingly as 
close of a sympathizer in London as Murray could get, even Shelburne's avowal would 
prove inadequate. As Shelburne argued for the incorporation of the Catholic 
Quebecois, most of the British who travelled to Quebec for political power chose instead 
to enact exclusion ism. 
While Murray certainly had his hands full in dealing with how to govern the 
conquered Quebecois political system, he found added pressure from the arrival of a 
fifth class of Quebec citizen: the English merchants. As the pre-conquest French 
merchants navigated the new administration with difficulty, they were eventually able to 
increase in strength and influence. A French Canadian elite began to arise through a 
Darwinistic elimination of the weakest elements. However, no matter how adaptable 
certain French merchants proved to be, they always held the distinct disadvantage of 
not being English. This played a gigantic role in most of the legislation that was passed 
in the early years of the conquest. English merchants flocked into the newly acquired 
colony like sharks that smelled blood in the water. All early indications were that 
Parliament was going to legislate under the notion that French Catholics could only ever 
maintain a second-hand citizenship with little rights, and no governing capacity. These 
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indications were of course true, but only to a certain extent. Sympathetic governors 
continued to fight for the rights of the Canadian, even when it spelled political suicide22 
Murray lost almost all support from the Board of Trade in July of 1765 when his 
most powerful ally, Prime Minister Grenville was dismissed from office and replaced by 
the unsympathetic Marquis of Rockingham. The two years preceding the ministerial 
change saw Murray's position on the rights of the French Canadians come under fire. 
Despite Murray's support from the people of Quebec, within a mere two months, the 
new ministry had already taken action upon him. In a letter to the King on the handling 
of the "ecclesiastical affairs" of Quebec, the Board of Trade recommended Murray be 
removed from office and directed to return to England to stand trial. In Murray's 
absence, the Board of Trade suggested a temporary Lieutenant Governor administer 
the colony's governance.23 
Murray was officially called to England to answer for charges by English 
merchants in Quebec of favoring the interests of the French Canadian citizens. In 
Murray's absence, the Quebecois sent petitions to the King in supplication of his return. 
The seigneurs of Montreal thanked the King "for having given them as Governor, the 
honourable James Murray."24 They went on to ask of the King to "graciously continue to 
them this Worthy Governor whose clearsightedness, Equity and wisdom continually 
afford him efficacious means for maintaining the people in tranquility and obedience." 
Despite such petitions, Murray was not reinstated, and Sir Guy Carleton was named the 
new Lieutenant Governor of Quebec. With this changing of the guard, a new era fell 
upon the colony. Sent in by the Board of Trade as a replacement for Murray, Carleton's 
primary duty was to calm the tensions between the original French inhabitants and the 
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empowered British merchants. Little could the Board of Trade realize at the time, 
Carleton's administration would favor the French Canadians' interests just as much as 
his predecessor Murray's.25 
In June of 1766, Lord Northington drafted a set of instructions for Governor 
Carleton concerning the rights of the Quebecois, which would have reinstituted a form 
of French civil law. The instructions stated the Royal Proclamation never intended to 
"abrogate the Jaws and customs of Canada in matters of tenure, or the succession and 
alienation of real and personal estates."26 The draft goes on to direct the governor to 
"issue a proc/amation ... explanatory of this our royal intention, in order to quiet the minds 
of our good subjects in respect of their local customs and usages." Though they 
provided no allowances for the tolerance of the Catholic religion, these instructions 
would have been groundbreaking in their legal concessions. Unfortunately for the 
Quebecois, these instructions were never officially sent to Carleton, instead the debate 
over French Canadian legal rights raged on in London. Neatby attributes this stunted 
legislation to the lobbying of the British merchants in Parliament.27 
In any case, Governor Carleton found himself forced to pick up where Murray left 
off, in the midst of a people with no legal right to its own judicial system. At the time, 
French civil law was not the only hot topic of debate in Quebec. The Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 clearly stated the Canadian government was to erect an elected 
assembly. Since the English merchants were primed to be the only beneficiaries of this 
model, both Murray and Carleton fought fervently for Parliament to reconsider the 
judicial and legislative rights of the Quebecois. 
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Chapter 2> "A just and humane piece of legislation"28 : Governor Carleton and the 
Passing of the Quebec Act 
Scholars of American history traditionally view the Quebec Act as the "attack on 
Protestantism"29 that helped to provoke the American colonists into revolt. Why 
wouldn't they? Contemporaries of the Quebec Act tended to lump it in with the other 
"intolerable" or "coercive" acts, assuming its sole purpose was to punish the New 
Englanders for their obstinacy. The Continental Congress responded to the Quebec 
Act's legalization of Catholicism by clearly resolving, "as men and Protestant Christians, 
we are indispensubly obliged to take all proper measures for our security."30 While it is 
not altogether uncommon for the American scholar to view the Quebec Act as a 
stepping-stone to the American Revolution, the act is done a great injustice when it is 
not also interpreted from a Canadian perspective. The Quebec Act ensured for the 
Quebecois people the freedom to practice their Catholic faith, restored to them their 
French civil law, extended the boundaries of Quebec to encompass a tremendous 
amount of territory previously ceded to the Native American peoples as a reservation, 
freed the Quebecois from the traditional oath of allegiance, which required the 
renunciation of Catholic beliefs in order to be granted all the rights and privileges of 
British subjects, and lastly established a government structure for the Quebecois devoid 
of the general assembly that was promised by the English constitution. While it is true 
the Quebec Act infuriated a great many British subjects both in London and in North 
America, the true impetus of the act was the fair and equal treatment of the inhabitants 
of Quebec. 
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In furthering the overall understanding of British imperialism's role on the 
Quebecois involvement in the American Revolution, this chapter specifically analyzes 
the Quebec Act's wide-ranging effect on the Quebecois social classes, particularly the 
nobility and merchants. While Canadian historians such as Hilda Neatby and Fernand 
Oullet choose to focus on the Quebec Act from a political perspective, usually as a 
precursor to the Canadian Constitution, they wind up providing relatively little analysis of 
the act's cultural implications. In an attempt to step beyond the current historiography, 
this chapter analyzes the various social issues that surrounded Quebec from the time of 
British conquest in 1760 up to the passing of the Quebec Act. At the heart of these 
social issues lied the tension between Quebec's French Seigniors and the growing 
British merchant class. This tension is neatly evidenced through various petitions to the 
King by both parties, as well as by Carleton's continued correspondence to London. 
Through the examining of these sources, particularly in regards to the legislation that 
led up to the passing of the Quebec Act, it is my intention to chart the changes in 
perspective on the governmental situation in Quebec beginning with the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763. 
It is easy for historians to gloss over the Royal Proclamation as it pertains to the 
governing of Quebec. Historians such as W. J. Eccles have interpreted it as the 
document that "sought to avert the outbreak of hostilities between the Indians and the 
Americans bent on driving them off their lands by any means."31 Certainly, the Royal 
Proclamation was greatly concerned with relations between the colonists and the 
Indians, as it was hurried through Parliament in response to Pontiac's Rebellion. 
However, regardless of Britain's response to Indian rebellion, the Royal Proclamation 
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was also the document responsible for establishing the parameters for the governing of 
the newly acquired Quebec. 
Leading to the eventual passing of the Quebec Act, the Royal Proclamation set 
the political stage in Quebec by effectively instituting British civil law and establishing 
the governor, council and assembly infrastructure as was practiced by the other North 
American colonies. It states "express Power and Direction" be given to the "Governors 
of our Said Colonies respectively," with directions for these governors "with the Advice 
and Consent of the Members of our Council" to "summon and call General Assemblies 
within the said Governments respectively." While the Royal Proclamation called for 
Quebec's government to be "as near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England, and 
under such Regulations and Restrictions as are used in other Colonies," it did offer the 
clause that "until such Assemblies can be called as aforesaid, all Persons Inhabiting in 
or resorting to our Said Colonies may confide in our Royal Protection for the Enjoyment 
of the Benefit of the Laws of our Realm of England." The importance of these 
instructions echoed over the next eleven years, as Quebec's Governors, Murray and 
Carleton both refused to call assemblies.32 
The administration of the British North American colonies was logically based 
upon the Parliamentary structure outlined in the English constitution. This structure 
called for a governor as a direct representative of the king, the governor's council to aid 
him in legislation, and a general assembly to represent the colonists. For Quebec, the 
original proposal for the Royal Proclamation drafted by Under Secretary of State for the 
Colonies John Pownall omitted the assembly altogether. Pownall stated the Quebecois 
were "under a legal disability of being admitted efficient members of the community so 
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as to act in any judicial or legislative capacity." In essence, astute politicians such as 
Pownall realized the incompatibility of an assembly-based government in Quebec based 
on the Quebecois' republican inexperience. However, the notion of a government in 
Quebec devoid of an assembly struck panic and anger in the hearts of British legislators 
and merchants, and the Quebecois, having had no conception of representative 
government showed little interest in an assembly anyway. Such being the case, it came 
as no surprise when Parliament disregarded Pownall's advice, and chose instead to 
insert the assembly.33 
The decision to include an assembly in Quebec's government would eventually 
become a key step towards the subjugating of the French Canadians, but only because 
of the oaths associated with the Test Acts. Dating as far back as the Reformation, the 
Test Acts were created to penalize recusants (those who refused to attend the Anglican 
Church). The acts required oaths of declaration and allegiance by all who were to hold 
office in Britain's government and courts. The acts were directed primarily toward 
Catholics in response to the paranoia caused by the actions of James I and Charles I. 
With such an anti-Catholic hysteria prevailing in England in the late seventeenth 
century, oaths swearing against Catholic beliefs became universally accepted in 
England. 
In 1763, when the Royal Proclamation successfully established Quebec as a 
British colony, Quebec's first Governor, James Murray received a set of instructions, 
which accompanied his commission. Both documents worked together to lay out in 
specific detail how Quebec was to be governed. In his commission, Murray was 
directed to administer "to all and every such person and persons as you shall think fit, 
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who shall at any time or times pass into our said Province or shall be resident or abiding 
there" a Declaration against Popery as outlined in An Act for preventing Dangers which 
may happen from Popish Recusants.34 The act called for takers of the oath to declare 
"that there is not any Transubstantiation in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, or in the 
Elements of Bread and Wine, at, or after the Consecration thereof by any person 
whatsoever," in essence swearing a disbelief in the Catholic faith. The act stipulated 
that "all and every the person or persons aforesaid that doe or shall neglect or refuse to 
take the said Oathes" would be ineligible "to have occupy or enjoy the said Office or 
Offices lmployment or lmployments" of British government.35 
The second oath called for in Murray's commission was taken from An Act for the 
further Security of His Majesties Person and the Succession of the Crown in the 
Protestant Line and for extinguishing the Hopes of the pretended Prince of Wales and 
all other Pretenders and their open and secret Abettors. This oath declared the taker's 
sworn allegiance to the protestant line of succession, and renounced James Stuart, "the 
Old Pretender" as the "Person [who] pretended to be Prince of Wales during the Life of 
the late King James and since his Decease." This act also called for a 
similar "incapacity of office" by any who refused to take the oath. It stated any who 
abstain from the oath be "adjudged incapable and disabled in Law to all Intents and 
Purposes whatsoever to have occupy or enjoy the said Office or Offices lmployment or 
lmployments."36 
In effect, while the Royal Proclamation promised representative government for 
the Quebecois, it was obvious no true representation would exist. Murray's commission 
explicitly stated the assembly members "duly Elected by the Major Part of the 
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Freeholders of the respective parishes, or precincts ... shall before their sitting take the 
oath mentioned in the said act.. .as also make and subscribe the forementioned 
declaration." Thankfully for the Quebecois, Murray acknowledged the subjugation such 
an assembly would create. He was therefore able to circumvent his order to call an 
assembly due to the clause in his commission, which allowed him to "call General 
Assemblies of the Freeholders and Planters, within your Government, in such; manner 
as you in your Direction shall judge most proper." Murray took full advantage of his 
governor's discretion despite constant appeals from British merchants.37 
In 1764, the first year of civil government in Quebec, an idea that permeated in 
Parliament was that Quebecois society could be molded "into a near image of that of 
Britain." While the legislators in London built up unrealistic expectations for the 
conversion of Quebecois society, Murray was left to deal with the reality; "stipulations 
governing the practice of the Catholic faith and law"38 left the majority of Quebecois 
without a political voice. As this opened the door for power-hungry protestant 
merchants immigrating from Britain and the other colonies, Murray ardently defended 
the French Catholics at every turn. Arguing on behalf of the Quebecois, Murray 
constantly urged Parliament to make exceptions. In 1764 Murray stated, "I cannot be 
the instrument of destroying, perhaps the best and bravest race on the globe, a race, 
that have already got the better of every national antipathy to their conquerors."39 
Murray did have his own ideas on how best to handle the religious conundrum in 
Quebec. In his initial report on the state of Quebec on 5 June 1762, Murray urged the 
King to maintain the existing French Bishopric. Murray suggested to the king "for the 
sake of keeping them in proper subjection, to nominate them himself or by those who 
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act under his authority."40 It was Murray's contention that the French Bishopric, being 
closely tied to the civil administration under the French regime ruled over the Quebecois 
clergy in a very effective manner. Murray argued Quebecois allegiance would be 
automatic if the English simply emulated the French model in Quebec. 
Murray had good reason to challenge his instructions in regards to religious 
toleration. The Articles of Capitulation clearly allowed for Catholic worship, stating the 
"free exercise of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Religion, shall subsist entire."41 
The Treaty of Paris, on the other hand included an escape clause. The treaty reads, 
"his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to 
the rites of the Rom ish church," but only "as far as the laws of Great Britain permit."42 In 
1763, with the passing of the Royal Proclamation, Murray was forced to watch with 
skepticism as the promise of freedom offered to the Quebecois was officially revoked. 
In a letter written by the Earl of Egremont, Secretary of the Southern Department just 
prior to the passing of the Royal Proclamation, Murray's fears were confirmed. That the 
king had established a religious tolerance in the Articles of Capitulation was 
acknowledged, however, Egremont cautioned the laws of Great Britain "prohibit 
absolutely all Popish Hierarchy in any of the Dominions belonging to the Crown of Great 
Britain, and can only admit a Toleration of the Exercise of that Religion."43 
Parliament's strict anti-Catholic legislature is aptly evidenced in the case of 
Quebec's courts. The proclamation ordered "Courts of Judicature and public Justice as 
may be agreeable to the Laws of England"44 to be erected for the first year of English 
civil rule. However, Murray continued to allow the French Canadians to practice law in 
their own language and custom. Murray believed the Canadians could be slowly 
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converted from Catholicism and the political ignorance of their feudal heritage, and 
shaped into a legitimate British colony. Murray's concession that English civil law would 
eventually prevail in Quebec was of little consolation to the merchants in Quebec or the 
members of Parliament. 
Trying to appease both sides, Murray penned his Ordinance establishing civil 
courts on 17 September 1764 in which he finally established English civil courts in 
Quebec. The ordinance refused the Quebecois their feudal civil law, but it did include 
modifications, which altered the traditional British court schema, evidencing an astute 
awareness of Quebec's unique situation. Chief among these modifications was a 
clause, which established "an inferior Court of Judicature, or Court of Common Pleas"45 
where Catholics would not be excluded, as well as a proposal "to allow Canadian 
advocates and proctors to practice in this court."46 Through his ordinance, Murray 
clearly tried to find a compromise, which could appease all sides. Unfortunately, as is 
illustrated by countless petitions to London, the English merchant class in Quebec 
would settle for nothing less than the general assembly that was promised. 
By the time Murray's ordinance took effect, a rift had already existed in Quebec 
between the French Seigniors and the recently emigrated British merchants. The 
Seigniors clung to their noble status and social entitlement, while the British merchants 
sought a complete overhaul of the political hierarchy in Quebec. The tension was only 
exasperated by the power imbalance that the newly formed, anti-Catholic government 
created.47 In a petition to the King, a group of British merchants accused Murray of 
favoring the French Quebecois over His "Majesty's most faithful and loyal subjects, 
British Merchants and Traders." The petition stated, "The Governor instead of acting 
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agreeable to that confidence reposed in him by your Majesty, in giving a favorable 
Reception to those of your Majesty's Subjects, who petition and apply to him on such 
important Occasions as require it," responds with "a Rage and Rudeness of Language 
and Demeanor, as dishonorable to the Trust he holds of your Majesty as painful to 
those who suffer from it." The petition continued by accusing Murray of displaying "most 
flagrant Partialities" such as "taking measures to keep your Majesty's old and new 
Subjects divided from one another, by encouraging the latter to apply for Judges of their 
own National Language." The merchants finished by stipulating Murray has made "your 
Majesty's loyal British Subjects, in the Province so very unhappy that we must be under 
the Necessity of removing from it, unless timely prevented by a Removal of the present 
Governor."48 
Responding to the British merchants' position, several of the French Seigniors 
penned an Address of the Principal inhabitants of Canada to the King, Relative to the 
Establishment of Courts of Justice, and the Presentment of the Grand Jury on 7 
January 1765. Under the guidelines of the administration set forth by the Royal 
Proclamation, French Canadians were ineligible to serve on a jury so long as they 
practiced the Catholic faith. This address begged the King to recognize such a 
discrepancy and reconsider the courts of justice, which were comprised of English 
jurors representing "about thirty English Merchants, of whom fifteen at the most, are 
settled here," while the French Canadians were "ten thousand Heads of Families who 
feel nothing but submission to the orders of Your Majesty." The address began by 
asserting, "the true Glory of a Victorious King consists in assuring to the vanquished the 
same happiness and the same tranquility in their Religion" that existed prior to their 
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defeat. The major concern was the practice of exclusionary representation based upon 
religious faith or practice. That the English jurors were not "submissive to the wise 
decisions of the Governor and his Council" was the Quebecois' primary subject of 
discontent. By illustrating their conformity to the Governor's rule, the plan of the French 
Seigniors was to appear docile and willing subjects to the King. The Seigniors 
maintained English Merchants displayed no respect for the law or the administration, 
and showed interest only in capitalizing on the disproportion of power.49 
Debate raged in London through the mid 1760's over whether or not to 
incorporate French Catholics in the government of Quebec. By claiming the French 
Quebecois, "cou'd they be indulged with a few priveledges" might "become the most 
faithful and most useful set of Men in this American Empire," 5° Murray's political stance 
left room for little doubt. Initially, Murray seemed to have an ally in the Earl of 
Shelburne, who while serving as president of the Board of Trade argued for a British 
control over rather than abolition of the Catholic institution in Quebec. Shelburne, like 
Murray believed the incorporation of the Catholic Quebecois was the key to successful 
administration in the colony. Shelburne maintained, "the Influence of Religion or rather 
Superstition is confined to a certain latitude, and that Nothing is to be feared from its 
effects in Arnerica."51 The Quebecois were continually reported to be nothing if not 
submissive to British rule, especially while under the impression their Catholic faith was 
to be tolerated. Shelburne seemed as close a sympathizer in London as Murray could 
get. However, even his avowal would prove inadequate. As Shelburne argued for the 
incorporation of the Catholic Quebecois, most of the British who travelled to Quebec for 
political power chose instead to enact exclusionism. 
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Murray lost almost all support from the Board of Trade in July of 1765 when his 
most powerful ally, Prime Minister Grenville was dismissed from office and replaced by 
the unsympathetic Marquis of Rockingham. The two years preceding the ministerial 
change saw Murray's position on the rights of the French Canadians come constantly 
under fire. Despite Murray's support from the people of Quebec, within a mere two 
months, the new ministry had already taken action upon him. In a letter to the King on 
the handling of the "ecclesiastical affairs" of Quebec, the Board of Trade stated of 
Murray "that we are humbly of Opinion ... that... Your Majesty's Governor ... return to 
this Kingdom ... and that in the mean time a proper person should be authorized to 
administer Government there."52 
Murray was officially called to England to answer for charges by English 
merchants in Quebec of favoring the interests of the French Canadians. In Murray's 
absence, the Qw§becois sent petitions to the King in supplication of his return. The 
seigneurs of Montreal thanked the King "for having given them as Governor, the 
honourable James Murray."53 They went on to ask the King to "graciously continue to 
them this Worthy Governor whose clearsightedness, Equity and wisdom continually 
afford him efficacious means for maintaining the people in tranquility and obedience." 
Despite such petitions, Murray was not reinstated, and Sir Guy Carleton was named the 
new Lieutenant Governor of Quebec. With this changing of the guard, a new era fell 
upon the colony. Sent in by the Board of Trade as a replacement for Murray, Carleton's 
primary duty was to calm the tensions between the original French inhabitants and the 
empowered British merchants.54 
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In June of 1766, Lord Chancellor Robert Henry, the Earl of Northington drafted a 
set of instructions for Governor Carleton concerning the rights of the Quebecois, which 
would have reinstituted a form of French civil law. The instructions stated the Royal 
Proclamation never intended to "abrogate the laws and customs of Canada in matters of 
tenure, or the succession and alienation of real and personal estates."55 The draft went 
on to direct the governor to "issue a proclamation ... explanatory of this our royal 
intention, in order to quiet the minds of our good subjects in respect of their local 
customs and usages." Though they provided no allowances for the tolerance of the 
Catholic religion, these instructions would have been groundbreaking in their legal 
concessions. Unfortunately for the Quebecois, Northington's instructions were never 
officially sent to Carleton, instead the debate over French Canadian legal rights 
continued in London. Due mostly to the lobbying of the British merchants, this stunted 
legislation proved Parliament was not yet ready to act against its own racial bias. 56 
With the ascension of Guy Carleton, optimism abounded among the British 
merchants in Quebec. Believing Parliament responded by replacing the obstinate 
Murray with a more favorable candidate, the merchants could not have predicted 
Carleton's political response. In fact, Carleton's specific orders were to find a 
compromise that could peaceably unite the French and British interests in Quebec. In 
June of 1767, Shelburne declared to Carleton in a letter "the right Administration of 
Government in Quebec is a matter of the greatest Importance." Carleton was asked to 
produce "every Information which can tend to elucidate how far it is practicable and 
Expedient to blend the English with the French Laws in order to for His Majesty's Old 
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and New Subjects, in order to the whole being confirmed & finally established by 
Authority of Parliament. "57 
Like Murray before him, Carleton understood the complexities involved with the 
governing of a French majority. Carleton also realized there was not enough interest in 
Canada to encourage proper British immigration. In a response to Shelburne in 1767, 
Carleton stated, "there is not the least Probability, this present Superiority should ever 
diminish," Carleton declared that "on the contrary 'tis more than probable it will increase 
and strengthen daily."58 Carleton's argument was based on the spreading throughout 
England of the notion that Canada was a frigid wasteland, along with the fact that the 
Quebecois people naturally increased at an astonishing rate. With the unlikeliness that 
British subjects would ever outnumber the French in Quebec, Carleton saw no 
alternative to the reinstating of French civil law. 
Carleton held no hope of a true representative government in Quebec. The 
English civil law and assembly structures that were so effective in the other British 
colonies would only work to subjugate an entire race of people. Carleton openly 
declared English law in Quebec as incompatible in a letter to the Earl of Shelburne by 
stating, "that it cannot long remain in Force, without a General Confusion and 
Discontent." He went on to suggest a repeal of the "Ordinance [of 1ih Sept. 1764] ... 
and for the present leave the Canadian Laws almost entire." Carleton intimated timing 
was the key issue with the Quebecois, and that rather than overhauling the entire 
French feudal governmental system, slight "Alterations might be made in the old and 
those new Laws Judged necessary." Carleton's alternative suggestion called for such 
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alterations to be published "as a Canadian Code, as was practiced by Edward the First 
after the Conquest of Wales. "59 
Having efficiently picked up where Murray left off on the debate over Quebec's 
government, Carleton pushed even harder against the British merchants. Carleton 
called for the reinstatement of the pre-British conquest Seigniorial system of 
government. In a Jetter to Shelburne on 24 December 1767, Carleton wrote "This 
System of Laws established Subordination, from the first to the lowest, which preserved 
the internal Harmony, they enjoyed until our Arrival, and secured Obedience to the 
Supreme Seat of Government from a very distant Province." Carleton argued that the 
Proclamation of 1763 completely overturned this very effective mode of governing the 
Quebecois, and introduced instead "A Sort of Severity, if I remember right, never before 
practiced by an Conqueror, even where the People, without Capitulation, submitted to 
His Will and Discretion."60 
Because the French feudal system contained absolutely no form of republican 
representation, British merchants' continually pleaded for the promised assembly. In a 
Jetter to Shelburne on 25 November 1767, Carleton maintained Quebec will "to the end 
of Time, be peopled by the Canadian Race, who already have taken such firm 
Root ... that any new Stock transplanted will be totally hid, and imperceptible amongst 
them."61 Carleton used this logic to strengthen his stance, stating "the better Sort of 
Canadians fear nothing more than popular Assemblies, which, they conceive, tend only 
to render the People refractory and insolent." The French held no hope at 
representation under the Test Acts, and the British Jaw gave all power to the minority. 
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By 1768, Carleton had hoped that finally the British merchants were relenting in 
their requests for an assembly. In a letter to Shelburne, he stated "I imagined, they had 
laid aside all Thoughts of the Kind, till lately one John McCord," a local merchant "who 
wants neither Sense or Honesty," started an uprising. Carleton described McCord as 
disgruntled, having opened up sheds near the barracks, where he "placed poor People 
to sell his Spirits to the Soldiers." When McCord's profits were "checked, by inclosing 
the Barracks to prevent the Soldiers getting drunk all Hours of the Day and Night," he 
"commenced Patriot, and with the Assistance of the late Attorney General, and three or 
four more, egged on by Letters from Home, are at work again for an Assembly."62 
Carleton's disdain for British merchants such as McCord appears later in the letter when 
he asserted "It may not be improper here to observe, that the British Form of 
Government, transplanted into this Continent, never will produce the same Fruits as at 
Home, chiefly, because it is impossible for the Dignity of the Throne, or Peerage to be 
represented in the American Forests." It was Carleton's conclusion that the French 
Seigniors were the closest thing to an honorable class of people that would ever inhabit 
Canada; therefore they should be accommodated, not submitted to the will of the 
merchants, whom Carleton loathed. 
Like Murray before him, Carleton refused to call an assembly, and like Murray, 
he was repeatedly petitioned. By 1770, the English merchants in Quebec were 
beginning to grow desperate. In a petition, the merchants contended they were the 
economic backbone of Quebec, claiming to "carry on three fourths of the Trade of this 
Country." The merchants continued by warning the king that "if a General Assembly is 
not soon order'd by Your Majesty ... Your Petitioners have the greatest reason to 
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apprehend their own ruin as well as that of the Province in general." The merchants 
asserted that with no assembly, the colony could not properly "make and enforce due 
obedience to Laws for encouraging Agriculture, regulating Trade," and "discouraging 
such Importations from the other Colonies as impoverish the Province."63 Should the 
king not force the governor's hand, the merchants maintained, the colony would meet 
with decay. 
In the same year of 1770, another petition found its way to London. The 
wealthier merchants and Seigniors decided to finally and formally request the 
reinstitution of their French civil law. Making the case that exclusion from offices in 
Quebec had been "painful and at the same time ... humiliating,"64 The Canadians 
requested of the king a reconsideration. It was the Quebecois' contention that their 
exclusion from public office simply because of their religion "seems to have made of us 
a reprobate nation." The efforts of Governors Murray and Carleton empowered the 
Canadians to finally ask London for the direct restoration of their laws. As Oullet 
contends, both governors were able to effectively ride the line between French 
Canadian interests and British racial legislation to "perpetuate Quebec's traditional 
society in opposition to the 'mercantile spirit.'" 65 
Even before Carleton's persuasiveness was able to burrow its way into 
Parliament's decision-making process, there were other influences at work. In 1766, in 
his Considerations on the Expediency of Procuring an Act of Parliament for the 
Settlement of the Province of Quebec, Baron Maseres, Attorney General of the 
Province of Quebec stated his opinions on many different facets of the governing of the 
colony. Among the more controversial topics that Maseres addressed was the question 
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of an assembly. Maseres declared if an assembly was to be erected with no Canadians 
being allowed to sit or vote "till they have subscribed the declaration against Popery, it 
would amount to an exclusion of all the Canadians." Maseres continued by stating "An 
assembly so constituted, might pretend to be a representative of the people there, but in 
truth it would be" comprised solely of the 600 British merchants in Quebec, "and an 
instrument in their domineering over the 90,000 French." Maseres then asked whether 
such an assembly could be "likely to produce harmony and friendship between the two 
nations?" He answered with "Surely it must have a contrary effect."66 
Later in his Considerations, Maseres played devil's advocate. He noted the 
danger inherent in admitting to the Quebecois the power and freedom of representative 
government. Maseres declared the Quebecois to be "Bigotted ... to the Popish 
religion ... and hitherto prejudiced against the laws and customs of England." As such, 
Maseres contended the Quebecois would be likely to "quarrel with the governor an 
council, or with the English members of the assembly." Lastly, Maseres added the 
Quebecois "are almost universally ignorant of the English language, so as to be 
absolutely incapable of debating in it." So, while Maseres noted the civil injustice an 
English assembly in Quebec would create, he realized that opening up the assembly to 
French members could not be an answer. Thus, the only logical solution could be the 
institution of the oligarchy Murray and Carleton had been arguing for.67 
By 1770, Parliament was not only listening to arguments for a change in the 
governing of Quebec, the legislators were in discussion. Isaac Barre asserted to the 
House of Commons on 7 December 1770 that Quebec "has been exceedingly ill used. 
It has been neglected." Barre challenged Parliament to rethink their Canadian policies 
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from a different viewpoint. He asked, "has any measure been taken, to please those 
new subjects, that you should have touched with delicacy? Have you tendered it to 
them, with a wise and prudent hand?" Barre concluded by advising his fellow legislators 
to enable the Quebecois to take ownership and pride over their governing, and only 
then could they truly become valuable British subjects.68 Barre, a retired soldier who 
was present at the capitulation of Quebec was voicing a "common concern" over the 
Jack of a policy resolution on the status of QuebecH9 
The year 1770 marked a watershed in Quebec's administration. Carleton 
travelled to London in order to lobby for the French Canadian interests. While it was 
easy for debaters in London to push aside correspondence from Murray and Carleton 
regarding the state of affairs in Quebec, to directly ignore Carleton's statements face-to-
face would prove infinitely more difficult. The Reports of the Board of Trade from 1770 
to 1773 provide ample documentation of the growing debate, particularly on the issues 
of Quebec's assembly and French civil law. While these reports differed in detail, 
progress was clearly evident, as they all seemed to agree in one way or another for the 
preservation of "some Canadian Jaw."70 
The years following 1770 saw the debates in Parliament further solidify. By 
1773, the decision was more or Jess finalized. During that year both the English 
merchants in Quebec and the Canadians each sent in one final petition, "the English 
asking an Assembly and the Canadians their 'ancient Jaws, privileges, and customs,' 
and both asking that the province be extended to its former boundaries."71 In the 
Canadian petition, signed by "Les Canadiens Vrais Patriotes," the French acquiesced to 
an acceptance of an assembly on the conditions that it be comprised of both "old and 
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new subjects," and that "the boundary of the province should be extended in order to 
favour trade."72 Though the actual author is anonymous, the most-likely author of this 
Canadian petition was Secretary to the Governor of Quebec Frangois-Joseph Cugnet. 
Cugnet frequently acted as the voice of the Canadians, and referred to himself as 
"Le Canadien Patriote."73 
Neatby credits these two petitions of 1773 as resulting in the meeting of 
"committees of English and Canadian merchants ... to prepare a joint petition."74 In a 
letter to Maseres, which accompanied the joint petition, the English committee stated "It 
is now the general opinion of the people (French & English) that an Assembly would be 
of the utmost advantage to the Colony, tho' they cannot agree as to the Constitution of 
it."75 This joint initiative established a precedent of cooperation and serious concern for 
the future in the colony of Quebec that transcended the existing racial power struggle. 
The inhabitants of Quebec, both French and English were ready to be taken seriously 
by Parliament. If Carleton needed an extra push to sway the legislators in London, this 
petition was it. 
In 1773, amid this cooperative revolution, three proposals for how to govern the 
Quebecois were being considered, one previously referenced by Thurlow, another by 
Advocate General Marriott, and the last by Solicitor General Wedderburn. Of the three, 
which all made compelling cases, it was Wedderburn's that was instrumental in 
Parliament's writing of the Quebec Act. Wedderburn's argument that "The safety of the 
state can be the only just motive for imposing any restraint upon men on account of 
their religious tenets" was very difficult to refute. While Carleton is commonly credited 
as the engineer of the Quebec Act, Philip Lawson reminds us "the labours of the 
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craftsmen such as Wedderburn now require acknowledgement and recognition."76 In a 
most influential argument for the freedom of religion, Wedderburn contended that the 
state has more to fear from the restriction of religion than the toleration of it. Asserting, 
"there is no instance of any state that has been overturned by toleration," Wedderburn 
reminded the legislators that the Quebecois were passive British subjects, and no 
longer a foreign threat. Wedderburn concluded by stating, "True policy dictates then 
that the inhabitants of Canada should be permitted freely to profess the worship of their 
religion; and it follows of course, that the ministers of that worship should be protected 
and a maintenance secured for them.''77 
Thanks to the efforts of proponents such as Wedderburn and Carleton, by the 
end of 1773, the groundwork of the Quebec Act had been successfully laid. All that 
remained was the passing of the actual legislature. The timing, however, could not 
have been more problematic. Parliament had committed to taking action on Quebec's 
governance in the fall of 1773, but the Boston Tea Party logically took precedence the 
following spring. The passing of the Quebec Act was delayed, which led to the 
controversial sequence of events that came to be known as the Coercive Acts.78 
Regardless of historical interpretations, the truth is that Parliament had been making 
assurances of Quebec's governmental overhaul since early in 1773. 
The proposed drafts of the Quebec Bill resulted in a yearlong debate in 
Parliament. Throughout the discussion, the "most contentious issues were the use of 
Canadian civil law and the refusal of an assembly.'' 79 The topics of Catholic tolerance 
and the proposed boundary extension found their way into the hot seat as well. In the 
debates, Great Britain's Prime Minister Lord North took the rhetorical helm; he is quoted 
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as stating the purpose of the bill was "undoubtedly to give a legislature to that country ... 
but can a better legislation be given than that of a governor and council?" North added 
"the best way to establish the happiness of the inhabitants is to give them their own 
laws.'' 80 
While many in Parliament agreed with Lord North there were those who clung to 
the opposing arguments. Such opponents touted the principles of English law, and 
preached against the legalization of Catholicism, a concept very fervently fought since 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. One such opponent, Colonel Barre responded by 
declaring the Bill "as bad in itself." Barre explained that he foresaw "it will not contribute 
to the peace of the country for which it is intended; and that it carries in its breast 
something ... dangerous to ... our other colonies." Renowned Whig and vocal advocate 
of representative government Edmund Burke stood in staunch defiance of the proposed 
Quebec Bill. Burke vehemently declared he would never give his "vote for establishing 
the French law," and that he "should be sorry to see his Majesty a despotic governor." 
Burke asks "am I sure that this despotism is not meant to lead to universal despotism? 
When that country cannot be governed as a free country, I question whether this can." 
Burke's contention was that the absence of representative government in Quebec was 
absolutely an indication of despotism. Burke maintained that if the British administration 
were to allow such a form of government to exist in one of its colonies, the door would 
be opened for the spread of further "despotism" throughout the British Empire. 81 
Arguing against French civil law, Chief Justice Hey maintained that the 
Canadians as a whole would have been better off under English civil law. Stating while 
the "pride of a few haughty seigneurs may perhaps revolt at the Idea of submitting their 
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conduct to the decision of a Rank of men they are too apt upon all occasions to 
despise," Hey argued that without an assembly, the other classes of Canadians 
received no governmental representation.82 Voiced concerns over the well being of the 
lower classes of Quebecois such as Hey's rarely appear in the archives. This lack of a 
Canadian voice can be attributed to the fact that few Quebecois were literate, and that 
of "the clergy, especially, many whose views would have been interesting may have 
thought it wiser not to express them in writing 83 
After a tremendous amount of debating in the House of Commons, the Quebec 
Act was pushed through Parliament on 13 June 1774. In its final form, the Quebec Act 
addressed every issue that was under debate. First, the territorial expansion of the 
Province of Quebec was defined. In very concise terms, the act laid out the new 
boundaries for Quebec, essentially establishing the colony to include the lands that the 
Royal Proclamation had deemed Indian reserves in 1763. From the east, this included 
all land from the Atlantic, down St. Lawrence and through its estuaries down the Ohio 
River, as far west as the Mississippi River, and all the land north of that "to the Southern 
Boundary of the Territory granted to the Merchants Adventurers of England, trading to 
Hudson's Bay." The act did, however, ensure the provision that "nothing herein 
contained, relative to the Boundary of the Province of Quebec, shall in anywise affect 
the Boundaries of any other Colony;" meaning Parliament realized the act would offend 
the other colonies, and was hoping to limit the outrage. 84 
The second issue covered by the Quebec Act was the reestablishment of French 
civil law as had been "protected, governed, and ordered, for a long Series of Years, 
from the First Establishment of the said Province of Canada." Such a concession 
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reinstated a legal system the Quebecois could understand, and one that could be 
practiced in the language that they spoke. The Canadians no longer needed to fear 
trials where the jury was comprised solely of the English merchant minority. Rather, the 
Quebecois could enjoy the liberty of a jury of their peers.85 
The third issue was the revoking of the "Oath required by the said Statute passed 
in the First Year of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth." Such a provision ensured the free 
practice of the Catholic religion in Quebec. This was a precedent not seen in the British 
Empire since the end of the sixteenth century. The only condition stated was that the 
quebecois "may have, hold, and enjoy, the free Exercise of the Religion of the Church of 
Rome, subject to the King's Supremecy." A new oath of loyalty to King George was 
required by all Quebecois, but since it made no mention whatsoever of religious faith, 
the compromise was welcomed. 
The fourth issue addressed by the Quebec Act legalized the Catholic Church's 
ability to collect tithes. It stated, "that the Clergy of the said Church may hold, receive, 
and enjoy, their accustomed Dues and Rights." While the act guaranteed the right to 
collect tithes, it did maintain the condition "with respect to such Persons only as shall 
profess the said Religion." Again, a precedent was set in the British Empire of religious 
tolerance not seen for almost two hundred years. 
The fifth issue pertained to property and civil rights. The act clearly stated, that 
"all His Majesty's Canadian Subjects, within the Province of Quebec ... may also hold 
and enjoy their Property and Possessions ... and all other their Civil Rights." The act 
later added, that "in all Matters of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil Rights, 
Resort shall be had to the Laws of Canada, as the Rule for the Decision." The provision 
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to this section of the act did state, however, "nothing in this Act contained shall extend, 
or be construed to extend, to any Lands that have been granted by His Majesty, His 
Heirs and Successors, to be holden in free and common Soccage." 
While the Quebec Act effectively reinstated French civil law, it left English 
criminal law intact. The act declared, "the Certainty and Lenity of the Criminal Law of 
England, and the Benefits and Advantages resulting from the Use of it, have been 
sensibly felt by the Inhabitants, from an Experience of more than Nine Years." The act 
also maintained for the "Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Commander in Chief for the 
Time being," the ability to amend and alter the established English mode of criminal law, 
should unforeseen circumstances arise. 
The last major issue of the debates of the Quebec Bill was that of the general 
assembly. The Quebec Act, in a last concession to Carleton and the Canadian 
petitioners specifically stated "it is at present inexpedient to call an Assembly." In 
regards to the governing of the colony, the Quebec Act again set a precedent by calling 
only for the Governor and his council. The act did offer the stipulation that "nothing in 
this Act contained shall extend to authorise or impower the said legislative Council to lay 
any Taxes or Duties within the said Province." In another provision, the act forbid 
ordinances touching on religion without "His Majesty's Approbation." 
The Quebec Act essentially righted the political wrongs of the Royal 
Proclamation. Parliament's idea to model Quebec's government on Britain's other 
successful North American colonies made perfect sense. Had only the level of British 
immigration to Quebec met expectations, the population balance would have allowed for 
a synchronous conversion. However, as power-hungry merchants seemed the only 
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British willing to transplant to the frigid colony, French Canadians were in no danger of 
losing the population battle. With the Quebecois effectively excluded from 
governmental and judicial representation, the very meaning of the English constitution 
was flipped on its head.86 
Because the Quebec Act was not enacted until 1 May 1775, the eleven months 
after its passing saw a raft of petitions and appeals for its rescindment. Opposition to 
the act differed greatly in form. Most notably, Protestants, who like Burke carried the 
banner of the Glorious Revolution, saw the religious concessions made by the Quebec 
Act as an invitation to Catholic despotism. Supporters of the Act were labeled as 
"enemies to liberty," and blacklisted in the London Evening Post87 In Quebec, 
response to the act seemed somewhat muted, but equally varied. The seigniors 
celebrated, having emerged victorious, while the English merchants continued to call for 
repeal. In a letter that was drafted three times, once for each of the King, the House of 
Lords, and the House of Commons, the merchants declared the Quebec Act as 
depriving them their protection by the "English Laws so universally admired for their 
Wisdom and Lenity." Rather, the merchants state "the Laws of CANADA are to be 
introduced to which we are utter Strangers." Chief among the merchants' complaints 
was the loss of Habeas Corpus, which they claim subjected them to "arbitrary Fines and 
Imprisonment at the Will of the Governor and Council who may at Pleasure render the 
Certainty of the Criminal Laws of no Effect by the great Power that is granted to them of 
making Alterations in the same."88 
The British merchant response to the Quebec Act was to be expected. However, 
it was the intent of British legislators to win over the Canadians. After the passing of the 
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act, Carleton reported in a letter to the Earl of Dartmouth "I have had the Satisfaction of 
finding His Majesty's Canadian Subjects impressed with the strongest sense of The 
King's great Goodness towards them." Carleton went on to assure that "All Ranks of 
People amongst them vied with each other in testifying their Gratitude and Respect, and 
the Desire they have by every Mark of Duty and Submission to prove themselves not 
undeserving of the Treatment they have met with," reassuring Parliament of the 
legislative victory in Canada.89 
Despite any initial reactions the Quebecois might have had, the apparent victory 
was almost instantly soured, as the year following the enactment would call for direct 
action. Revolt broke out in New England, partly in direct response to the Quebec Act. 
With it, the Quebecois' loyalty to the British crown was instantly tested. Carleton and 
the political engine in Quebec fought feverishly to hold its newfound constituents as the 
American Propaganda machine was now in full swing, and in 1775, winning over the 
Quebecois was a chief ambition for both sides. 
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Chapter 3> "Uniting with us in the defence of our common liberty"90: Why 
the Americans chose to invade Canada, and why it failed. 
The once formidable fortress of Ticonderoga, stationed on the south end of Lake 
Champlain served as the gateway either north into the St. Lawrence or south down the 
Hudson River, depending on which army controlled it. Prior to hostilities breaking out 
between the British and the New Englanders in 1775, Ticonderoga was a shamble of a 
fortress in the hands of the British. On 15 February 1767, Governor Carleton, upon 
contemplating the possibility of a war on the continent urged Major General Gage to see 
to the state of the "Forts of Crown Point, Ticonderoga, and Fort George," which Carleton 
claimed were "in a very declining Condition, of which, I believe, Your Excellency is well 
informed." Carleton used this communication to convey the notion that the defense of 
the province was "not only expedient, but indispensably necessary for the Interest of 
Great Britain, and His Majesty's Service." The danger Carleton perceived was of a 
possible "Faction or Party" of men "not thoroughly bound to their Duty" who might rise 
up in rebellion. 91 Carleton's premonition came true when, on 9 May 1775, Ethan Allen 
along with about two hundred of his "Green Mountain Boys" took the fortress easily. 
Allen is famously quoted as ordering the surrender of Ticonderoga "In the name of the 
great Jehovah, and the Continental Congress."92 
From Ticonderoga, colonials, under the leadership of General Montgomery and 
Colonel Benedict Arnold went on to take the strongholds of St. Jean, Crown Pointe, and 
Montreal before marching to the doorstep of Quebec City. Canada had been invaded, 
and the Canadians, who were still recovering from the French and Indian War fifteen 
years earlier, were forced to choose sides. In the previous two chapters, I discussed 
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the cultural and political distinctions between the various classes of Quebecois leading 
up to the Invasion of Canada. The Quebecois, who had just benefitted from the passing 
of the Quebec Act when war broke out were now being asked to join in a revolt against 
the very imperial engine that had just conceded a great deal of liberty to them. This 
chapter will build upon the analyses of the previous two chapters in order to illustrate 
and comprehend the manners in which the various classes of Quebecois responded to 
the Revolutionary War, especially to the Invasion of Canada in 1775. Integral to the 
understanding of the varying Quebecois viewpoint, this chapter begins by analyzing the 
actions of both the Continental Congress and the colonial armies in order to pinpoint the 
various triggers of Canadian reactions throughout the early years of the Revolutionary 
War. 
On 17 September 1774, three months after the passing of the Quebec Act, the 
Continental Congress met to discuss how best to respond to what they penned as the 
"Intolerable Acts". Congress wound up putting forth a resolution denouncing those acts 
of Parliament. The preamble of which stated: 
If a boundless extent of continent, swarming with millions, will tamely submit to live, 
move and have their being at the arbitrary will of a licentious minister, they basely 
yield to voluntary slavery, and future generations shall load their memories with 
incessant execrations.--On the other hand, if we arrest the hand which would 
ransack our pockets, if we disarm the parricide which points the dagger to our 
bosoms, if we nobly defeat that fatal edict which proclaims a power to frame laws for 
us in all cases whatsoever, thereby entailing the endless and numberless curses of 
slavery upon us, our heirs and their heirs forever; if we successfully resist that 
unparalleled usurpation of unconstitutional power, whereby our capital is robbed of 
the means of life; whereby the streets of Boston are thronged with military 
executioners; whereby our coasts are lined and harbours crouded with ships of war; 
whereby the charter of the colony, that sacred barrier against the encroachments of 
tyranny, is mutilated and, in effect, annihilated; whereby a murderous law is framed 
to shelter villains from the hands of justice; whereby the unalienable and inestimable 
inheritance, which we derived from nature, the constitution of Britain, and the 
privileges warranted to us in the charter of the province, is totally wrecked, annulled, 
Luedtke 45 
and vacated, posterity will acknowledge that virtue which preserved them free and 
happy; and while we enjoy the rewards and blessings of the faithful, the torrent of 
panegyrists will roll our reputations to that latest period, when the streams of time 
shall be absorbed in the abyss of eternity. 
Clearly, the Continental Congress chose such carefully flourished language in order to 
defend their treasonous intentions. The Continental Congress' resolution outlined the 
various offenses Parliament was said to have committed toward the colonies including 
the blocking of Boston Harbor and the altering of the Massachusetts charter. 
Specifically among such offenses was listed "the late act of parliament for establishing 
the Roman Catholic religion and the French laws in that extensive country, now called 
Canada," which Congress claimed was "dangerous in an extreme degree to the 
Protestant religion and to the civil rights and liberties of all America." There could be no 
denying that the colonies were of the impression the Quebec Act was passed in direct 
response to, and in punishment for the actions of the New England colonists.93 
John Jay interpreted the Quebec Act as a way for Britain to mold the colony of 
Quebec into a weapon for use against the other Protestant colonies. By governing 
Quebec in a manner "as that by being disunited from us, detached from our interests by 
civil as well as religious prejudices," Jay argued that Parliament was bent on making the 
colonists pay. Jay's statement contending the Quebecois were being primed as "fit 
instruments in the hands of power to reduce the ancient, free Protestant colonies to the 
same state of slavery with themselves," supported the well documented and common 
notion that the Continental Congress perceived the Quebec Act as legislative 
punishment. 94 
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Ironically, after so much racially-charged political propaganda, the Continental 
Congress came to the conclusion that they would do better to bring Quebec into the fold 
as a fourteenth colony, rather than risk it remaining a part of Britain, and therefore a 
stronghold from which to launch attacks on New England and New York. So it was that 
the Congress composed its first letter to the inhabitants of Canada, urging an alliance 
against the cruel subjugation, which they claimed was British imperial rule. The letter, 
penned again by John Jay asked the Canadians to set aside their religious differences, 
for, Jay proposed "we perceived the fate of the protestant and catholic colonies to be 
strongly linked together," so Jay entreated the Canadians join the other colonies "in 
resolving to be free, and in rejecting, with disdain, the fetters of slavery, however artfully 
polished." Contrary to the Quebecois' understanding of the Quebec Act, Jay maintained 
Parliament had established in Canada a "present form of government, or rather present 
form of tyranny" in which the Quebecois "have nothing that you can call your own, and 
all the fruits of your labour and industry may be taken from you, whenever an avaritious 
governor and a rapacious council may incline to demand them." Jay pointed out that if 
war did break out, the Quebecois would be called upon to fight anyways, so they might 
as well fight for their liberty and freedom from oppression. 95 
While it was eloquently persuasive, the letter did not have the effect that the 
Continental Congress had hoped. This was due partly to the fact that the majority of 
French Canadian habitants, who were Congress' best hope for sympathy in Quebec 
could not read in the eighteenth century, and needed the letter read to them. Of course, 
the letter could not sway the Quebecois seigniors or French merchants, all of whom had 
finally just won their ten year political battle for the right to civil law and the freedom of 
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their Catholic faith. Rather, Carleton was able to stir up the upper class and the clergy 
into remaining loyal to the British crown, leaving the American rebels on their own. 
What Carleton was not able to achieve, however, was enough support among the 
Canadians to rally any sort of army capable of doing the American colonies any real 
damage.96 
Long before the invasion, the Continental Congress did make other attempts at a 
peaceful alliance with Quebec. The mindset and perception of the Quebecois was of 
the upmost importance to both the British and the colonials, and so propaganda poured 
in from both directions. In response to Carleton's initial report of the Canadian fervor for 
the passing of the Quebec Act, the Earl of Dartmouth responded with some skepticism. 
Dartmouth did proclaim a satisfaction that Carleton "found His Majesty's Canadian 
Subjects impressed with a just Sense of His Majestys Goodness to them," and "with the 
Regulations adopted for the future Government of the Colony." However, Dartmouth 
warned that as Carleton remained "silent as to the Sentiments of His Majesty's Natural 
born Subjects in Canada respecting the late Act," and thus that he was "not at liberty to 
conclude that they entertain the same opinion of it." Dartmouth realized that Canadian 
loyalty could not be taken for granted. The Quebecois might not be as fiery about the 
notion of liberty as the New Englanders, but their ambiguous nature left him unfulfilled. 
Dartmouth concluded to Carleton that after the Quebec Act had been in effect long 
enough for the Canadian subjects to understand its true intentions, "prejudices which 
popular Clamour has excited, will cease, and that His Majesty's Subjects of every 
description will see and be convinced of the Equity and good Policy of the Bill." 
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Dartmouth held high hopes of the Quebec Act's eventual success, but was keenly 
aware of the tensions of the immediate situation. 97 
While British legislators were preoccupied with the Quebecois' allegiance, in 
September of 1774, General Gage ordered <!II regular British troops stationed in 
Canada to be dispatched to Boston in anticipation of the building conflict. This left 
Carleton in a very vulnerable position, having little in the way of an army to protect 
against the coming continentals. By May of 1775, the Continental Congress had made 
up its mind. Quebec needed to join the rebellion, either willfully or by coercion. More 
attempts at a peaceful solution were made, but the Congress had grown impatient.98 
After the taking of Fort Ticonderoga, Colonel Ethan Allen crossed the Canadian 
border on multiple missions to build a rapport with the Quebecois. Allen's hope was to 
build sympathy for the American cause. In his journal of captivity, Allen spoke of his 
orders to advance into Canada with "letters to the Canadians, and to let them know, that 
the design of the army was only against the English garrisons, and not the country, their 
liberties, or religion."99 In the first such letter, Allen insisted that war between the 
colonies and Britain was inevitable, but he implored, was "it necessary that the 
Canadians and the inhabitants of the English colonies should butcher each other? God 
forbid. There are no controversies subsisting between us." In the letter, Allen 
recounted an occurrence of an American reconnoitering party being fired upon by a host 
of Canadians. Allen insisted that "special orders from the colonies were, to befriend and 
protect you ... so that if you desire their friendship, you are invited to embrace it for 
nothing can be more undesirable ... than a war with their fellow subjects, the 
Canadians."100 Such a correspondence was an excellent illustration of the caution that 
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was taken toward Canadian relations at the time. A war with Canada was truly in no 
one's best interest, but ultimately, Congress could not allow the British an easy route 
into the heart of the colonies. 
The Canadians, which Allen and other colonial emissaries came into contact with 
were described for the most part as being possessed of "politeness and civility," such as 
those "poor Canadian peasants" that Isaac Senter and Benedict Arnold encountered 
once they began to close in on Quebec City. 101 Of course, these particular peasants 
were located on the fringe of the colony and as such were less under the heavy 
influence of the Canadian clergy. Throughout the colony of Quebec, one of the most 
common problems the Americans encountered was the reliance the Canadian habitants 
had upon the clergy and seigniors to read and interpret Congress' letters. This naturally 
meant, as Canadian Prudent Lajeunesse explained to Congress, that all of their letters 
would be explained "in a way which would prejudice their hearers against the 
Americans." Lajeunesse informed Congress "The same interpreters had read articles 
from New York royalist newspapers affirming that the rebels meant to suppress the 
Catholic religion and to appropriate the property of Canadians." Thus the letters were 
only an effective means of communication with Canada's literate classes, all of which 
had proven to be the unswayable.102 
The only responders to Congress' letters provided little or no solace. In reply to 
those letters, four merchants from Montreal offered their empathy, but could not provide 
any sort of physical support. The merchants replied they were "more the objects of pity 
and compassion that yourselves, who are now suffering under the heavy hand of 
power." The merchants declared themselves forced to remain mute under the 
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"unlimited power of the governor," who would strike "all opposition dead," forcing the 
Quebecois to "groan in silence, and dream of lettres de cachet, confiscations, and 
imprisonments; offering up their fervent prayers" to the cause of the united colonies. 
The merchants continue by lamenting the fact that "the British inhabitants of this widely 
extended province, united in their sentiments ... have neither numbers nor wealth 
sufficient to do ... any essential service." The British merchants insisted that "the bulk of 
the people, both English and Canadians" wished the best for the rebellion, believing that 
if the united colonies succeeded, then Quebec would be ceded as well. However, the 
merchants maintained they could do no good voicing or acting upon any support. They 
declared themselves "being of no more estimation in the political machine, than the 
sailors are, in shaping the course or working the ship in which they sail."103 
Though the merchants professed their hopes for the rebellion's success, they 
assured the Congress the noblesse was not of the same opinion. Declaring the 
Canadian gentry as having no notion "of liberty, or law," the merchants claimed "the pre-
eminence given to their religion, together with a participation of honors and offices in 
common with the English, not only flatters their natural pride and vanity, but is regarded 
by them, as a mark of distinction and merit, that lays open their way to fortune." Lastly, 
the merchants remarked that "it may not be amiss just to hint, that the idea the 
Canadians seem to have of this colony, at present is, that it is to be a French 
government, holding under the crown of Great Britain; from which they mean to exclude 
every Englishman, save the governor and lieutenant governor." The merchants, in 
attempt to convey their complete empathy to the united colonies concluded the letter by 
stating "we heartily wish our abilities to serve you were equal to our wills, and pray 
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Heaven to prosper your generous purpose; and are, with the utmost consideration and 
feeling for your distresses." Furthermore, in the postscript, the merchants begged, "that 
this letter may not be now published, for fear of bad consequences to the subscribers." 
Congress realized its challenge would be to peaceably win over the illiterate habitants, 
who comprised the majority of Quebec's population. Because Congress could find no 
way of reaching out to the bulk of the Canadian peasantry, it saw no other choice but 
invasion.104 
When news that Montgomery was marching on Montreal had spread, Carleton, 
with the aid of his loyal supporters including prominent merchant Pierre Guy called up a 
militia. As Guy proclaimed, "the gentry, the clergy, and most of the bourgeois" exhibited 
"the greatest zeal and fidelity to the King's service, and exerted their best endeavours to 
reclaim their infatuated countrymen,"105 however, the habitants did not rally to the call of 
their militia officers. Instead began a pattern in Quebec of the habitants either 
remaining neutral and abstaining from the fighting altogether or selling their allegiance 
to the highest bidder. In a letter to Dartmouth, William Tryon, the former governor of 
New York complained that Canadian habitants would march for Carleton only "on 
condition that a large enough troop of British soldiers could be assembled to support 
them if they were repulsed." Tryon implied the habitants would simply remain neutral 
otherwise.106 
Hector Cramahe, President of the Council of Quebec, and Civil Secretary to 
Carleton exclaimed in a letter to Dartmouth that "No Means have been left untried to 
bring the Canadian Peasantry to a Sense of their Duty, and engage them to take up 
arms in Defence of the Province, but all to no Purpose." Cramahe was instrumental in 
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the Battle of Quebec in 1775 as he readied the city's defenses while Carleton retreated 
from Montreal. As such, Cramahe was able to assess the levels of loyalty and 
discipline held by the varying classes of Quebecois on the eve of the attack. Cramahe 
remarked "Justice must be done to the Gentry, Clergy, and most of the Bourgeosie, that 
they have shewen the greatest Zeal and Fidelity to the King's Service, and exerted their 
best Endeavours to reclaim their infatuated Countrymen." Cramahe's final assessment 
to Dartmouth was that "some Troops, and a Ship of War or two, would in all likelihood 
have prevented this general Defection."107 
Carleton similarly complained of the habitants' lack of patriotic duty. In a letter to 
General Gage, Carleton remarked of the habitants "ever since the Civil Authority has 
been introduced into the Province, the Government of it has hung so loose, and 
retained so little Power, they have in a Manner emancipated themselves." Carleton 
warned that though the Canadians were conceded a great deal in the Quebec Act, only 
time and strict management could extract from them the obedience and discipline that 
was expected from British citizens, especially during a time of strife or war. Carleton 
added that the Canadians had just begun the recovery process from the last war that 
tore their lives apart, and that they shouldn't be expected to be "pleased at being 
suddenly, and without Preparation embodied into a Militia, and marched from their 
Families, Lands, and Habitations to ... all the Horrors of War, which they have already 
experienced."108 
Carleton recognized and understood the common impatience suffered by the 
typical Briton, especially with the situation in the colonies turning hostile, but he 
cautioned "the Act is no more than the Foundation of future Establishments," and that 
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as such "the new Commissions and Instructions, expected out, are not yet arrived, and 
that the Dissolution of the present Constitution, if it deserves the Name, and 
Establishment of the new one, are still at some Distance." Carleton knew that by 
gaining the trust and allegiance of the noblesse, the clergy, and the French merchants it 
was only a matter of time. The peasants were unaccustomed to leadership. Their 
feudal upbringing had prepared them to exhibit the least amount of loyalty necessary to 
appease their seigniors. Carleton's long-term plan called for a deep rebirth of society 
from the top down. Carleton quipped to Gage, "had the present Settlement taken Place, 
when first recommended, it would not have roused the Jealousy of the other Colonies, 
and had the appearance of more disinterested Favor to the Canadians."109 
In any case, not enough time had elapsed for Carleton's plan of allegiance to be 
realized. Simply put, the habitants were torn. Many Americans saw this lack of patriotic 
zeal as a golden opportunity, and so action was called for. In a letter forwarded to 
Major General Wooster in June of 1775, which comprised of notes from the New York 
Congress, various accounts of the state of Montreal were conveyed. Among these, one 
forwarded by Connecticut Governor, Jonathan Trumbull reported that in Montreal, a 
"number of Canadians have expected our army there, and are impatient of our delay, 
being determined to join us as soon as sufficient force appears to support them." The 
report continues by declaring "that Gov. Carleton, by every art, can raise no more than 
twenty Canadians of the noblesse: that he threatens to burn Montreal, if the merchants 
won't defend the city, in case of an attack." The Continental Congress wasted no time 
in launching their attack. 110 
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After being informed of the aggressive acts of Arnold and Allen on the fortresses 
of Ticonderoga and St. John's, Carleton professed in a letter to Dartmouth the 
underwhelming response of the Quebecois when asked to rally to their country's 
defense. Carleton referred to his "little Force" as being comprised mostly of the nobles 
who were meant to lead. The letter stated that after being ordered to call the habitants 
and Indians to the militia, "the Gentlemen testified great Zeal," but "neither their 
Entreaties or their Example could prevail upon the People." Rather, Carleton lamented 
only "a few of the Gentry, consisting principally of the Youth ... formed a small Corps of 
Volunteers," while "the Indians shewed as much Backwardness as the Canadian 
Peasantry. "111 
The fact that Montgomery and Arnold were able to waltz right up to the walls of 
Quebec, ransacking all posts and fortresses along the way was evidence enough that 
Canada was in no state to participate in a war. Had Arnold and Montgomery not felt 
pressured into attacking when they did, mostly due to the fact that a great many of their 
soldiers' enlistments were soon to be expired, the battle of Quebec might have had a 
much different outcome. When Arnold's army, which marched up the Kennebec River 
using an incredibly inaccurate map and poorly crafted boats finally managed to reach 
Quebec City in November of 1775, it was at less than a quarter strength. Arnold's army 
suffered massive losses to disease and desertion during the grueling march. Isaac 
Senter, a physician and surgeon dispatched with Arnold's unit commented on the 
abhorrent conditions through which they marched. Senter described the troops' morale 
as having reached "the zenith of distress." According to Senter, as "several had been 
entirely destitute of either meat or bread," the troops had reverted to consuming "the 
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shaving soap, pomatum, and even the lip salve, leather of their shoes, cartridge boxes, 
&c .. " In any case, by the time it reached Quebec City, Arnold's force was not prepared 
for a full on attack, especially during a harsh winter storm.112 
Montgomery's army fared much better than Arnold's en route to Quebec. Aside 
from the losses of Allen's advance troop of Green Mountain Boys and scouts, 
Montgomery's force was mostly intact by the time it reached Quebec City. In fact, as 
Montgomery's army succeeded in sacking fort after fort, it picked up steam in the form 
of Canadian volunteers. When Montgomery took Montreal, he had some 500 
Canadians in his ranks. Every American success was a political debacle for Carleton. 
The habitants, who were on the fence as it was, found very little motivation to join the 
militia; the Canadian peasants who did not participate in Montgomery's march into the 
heart of the colony tended to sway instead toward neutrality. This basically ensured an 
open road to Quebec City. 113 
Carleton, realizing the futility of facing off against Montgomery's superior force 
abandoned Montreal without a fight. Trois Rivieres followed suit, and Carleton instead 
focused all his efforts on a last stand at Quebec City. While Montgomery's army was 
significantly larger than the force that defended Quebec City, what was lacking was 
artillery. Arnold's shamble of an army could not help in that department; he was lucky to 
have successfully completed his march up the Kennebec at all. When the armies of 
Montgomery and Arnold finally converged outside the walls of Quebec in December, 
Montgomery was faced with a conundrum; many of his enlistments expired at the end of 
the year, and he knew there was no hope in persuading them to stay on through the 
harsh winter without first winning over the heart of Quebec. So it was that Montgomery 
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and Arnold foolishly attacked the great fortress city in the middle of a harsh winter storm 
on 30 December 1775. In the fray, Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. The 
American forces suffered heavy casualties, but Arnold refused to let up. Instead he 
held a siege on Quebec City that lasted until British reinforcements arrived the following 
May. During the long siege, Arnold was not only unsuccessful at keeping his own army 
intact (they suffered heavy losses to small pox and desertion), but as time elapsed; his 
ability to maintain any sort of Canadian allegiance dwindled. This is not to say the 
habitants rushed to the banner of Carleton, though some did, rather, the bulk of the 
Canadian peasantry reverted to its neutral state. 114 
The invasion of Canada was a failure, but not because the Canadians rallied 
to the defense of their capitol. In August of 1775, William Hey, Chief Justice of Quebec 
wrote to the Lord Chancellor on the state of Canadian affairs. In his report, Hey 
remarked that his opinion of the Quebecois habitants had changed substantially. Hey 
admitted he was once a chief supporter of the quebecois citizenry, having professed 
their "Loyalty, obedience & Gratitude, of their habitual submission to Government, & 
their decent civil & respectful I demeanour to those who had the conduct of it." However, 
after witnessing the turn of events leading up to the Battle of Quebec, Hey changed 
drastically changed his disposition. Hey remarked that while "time and accident have 
evinced that they were obedient only because they were afraid to be otherwise," the 
withdrawal of the British troops in Quebec removed that fear, and with it was "gone all 
the good disposition that we have so often and steadily avowed in their names & 
promised for them in ages to come." Hey, like Carleton did concede that timing was a 
factor, and that "temperate management and gentle methods of persuasion and 
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instruction may yet bring them to a sense of their duty & indeed their interest." 
Unfortunately for Britain, that time could not be accelerated in order to rouse the sense 
of patriotic duty in the habitants that was necessary for the defense of the country. 
Fortunately for Britain, it did not matter in the long run, as the invaders defeated 
themselves, and Quebec was allowed the precious time it needed in order to convert 
the Quebecois into the British subjects they were promised to be. 
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Conclusion 
Parliament's idea to model Quebec's government on Britain's other successful 
North American colonies made perfect sense. Had only the level of British immigration 
to Quebec met expectations, the population balance would have allowed for a 
synchronous conversion. However, as power-hungry merchants seemed the only 
British willing to transplant to the frigid colony, French Canadians were in no danger of 
losing the population battle. With the Quebecois effectively excluded from 
governmental and judicial representation, the very meaning of the English constitution 
was flipped on its head.115 
In retrospect, Attorney General of Quebec, Baron Francis Maseres observed in 
1766 that while an assembly "might pretend to be a representative of the people there ... 
in truth it would be a representative of only the 600 new English settlers," as opposed to 
the 90,000 French Canadians. 116 When the Royal Proclamation was conceived, it was 
thought to "attract English settlers in such numbers as would ultimately absorb the 
Canadians." 117 This doesn't mean the Proclamation was designed with the intention to 
subjugate the Quebecois. Rather legislators believed a major influx of British interests 
in Quebec would lead to an Anglo-Saxon majority, therefore justifying the 
Proclamation's inherent racial discrimination. 
Governor Murray dedicated a great deal of his administration to the protecting of 
Quebecois' rights, but in the end, such efforts resulted only in his removal from office. 
Carleton picked up where Murray left off, and continued to work towards the restoration 
of French Canadian society in opposition to the traditional English mercantilism that had 
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been spread all over the globe. While ultimately, the efforts of Murray and Carleton 
prevailed in the form of the Quebec Act, the timing of its passing conveniently aligned 
with the many other actions of Parliament, which drove the united colonies to rebel. 
Carleton was able to hold Quebec together during the Revolution, but the Quebecois' 
status as British citizens was put to the test. 
With the aid of retrospect, Carleton remarked in a letter to Lord George Sackville 
Germain, Dartmouth's successor as Colonial Secretary in regards to "the Canadians, I 
think there is nothing to fear from them, while we are in a state of prosperity, and 
nothing to hope for when in distress." Carleton found himself stuck in a political vise. 
He was forced to fend off a hostile invasion with no army of regulars. Rather, he was 
asked to defend his province with a militia comprised of newly conquered subjects, who, 
though they were conceded a great deal by contemporary standards, were themselves 
struggling to stay afloat, and weary to choose a side for fear it might turn out to be the 
losing one. Fortunately, in the end, Carleton's faction was able to outlast the siege at 
Quebec City, and his Canadian subjects were not further tested for loyalty in combat. 
There is no telling what the result might have been. Carleton's remarks to Germain 
summed the situation up nicely when he declared "I speak for the People at large; there 
are among them those who are guided by Sentiments of honour, but the multitude is 
influenced only by hopes of gain, or fear of punishment," and the year of 1775 was a 
very uncertain time to be a Canadian, not knowing which side would prevail. 118 
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